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FACTIONS, TENDENCIES AND CONSENSUS IN THE SNP 
IN THE 1980s 
James Mitchell 
I bitterly regret the day I comgromised the unity of my party by 
admitting the second member.< 
A work written over a decade ago maintained that there had been 
limited study of factional politics<2l. This is most certainly the case as far as 
the Scottish National Party is concerned. Indeed, little has been written on 
the party itself, with the plethora of books and articles which were 
published in the 1970s focussing on the National movement rather than the 
party. During the 1980s journalistic accounts tended to see debates and 
disagreements in the SNP along left-right lines. 
The recent history of the party provides an important case study of 
factional politics. The discussion highlights the position of the '79 Group, a 
left-wing grouping established in the summer of 1979 which was finally 
outlawed by the party (with all other organised factions) at party 
conference in 1982. The context of its emergence, its place within the SNP 
and the reaction it provoked are outlined. Discussion then follows of the 
reasons for the development of unity in the context of the foregoing 
discussion of tendencies and factions. 
Definitions of factions range from anthropological conceptions 
relating to attachment to a personality to conceptions of more ideologically 
based groupings within liberal democratic parties<3l. Rose drew a 
distinction between parliamentary party factions and tendencies. The 
former are consciously organised groupings with a membership based in 
Parliament and a measure of discipline and cohesion. The latter were 
identified as a stable set of attitudes rather than a group of politicians but 
not self-consciously organised<4l. This distinction has value when 
considering extra-parliamentary parties. A third element identified by 
Rose was the non-aligned party membership. This element is critical and 
results from "an active concern with only the gross differences between 
electoral parties, from a passive attitude towards policy issues, or from a 
calculated desire to avoid identification with particular tendencies or 
factions in order to gain popularity within the whole electoral party". (S) 
Factions are often perceived to connote "illegality, if not malevolence 
and pathology". <6l A tendency may have considerable influence and 
consequently will not require to be consciously organised with a 
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membership, discipline or organised structure. A dominant tendency has 
the advantage of avoiding the connotation of illegality. Weaker tendencies 
may feel a need to organise in order to challenge the dominant tendency but 
lose out by the very act of becoming an organised faction. Indeed, many 
who would otherwise be associated with a tendency might, having 
recognised this danger, disown or distance themselves from the faction. 
The importance of the dominant tencency- or tendencies, as these differ in 
terms of personnel depending on the issue- cannot be understated within a 
political party as open and democratic (almost to the point of disproving 
Michels' iron law of oligarchy) as the Scottish National Party. 
The referendum in 1979, and the subsequent general election marked 
a turning point in the fortunes of the SNP. They marked the outbreak of 
open and often bitter divisions and the emergence of the '79 Group which 
established itself as a socialist republican grouping. Defeats and setbacks 
have the effect of bringing to the fore existing and often deep rooted 
divisions which are less obvious at times of electoral success. The staggering 
setback suffered by the SNP brought these to light, especially after the 
period of heady optimism which had preceded the Spring of 1979. 
Party vs Movement 
The cliche that political parties are broad churches is as appropriate in 
the SNP as any other party. While much of the debate is conducted in 
conventional left-right language, the SNP's tendencies are more complex. 
This is not to say that Nationalist politics are not marked by debates along 
conventional lines. Left-right divisions do exist and cannot be avoided. For 
any Nationalist party which is attempting to build support for its cause and 
which has gained sufficient support to give it elected representation, 
whether at parliamentary or local government level, there will be a need for 
the party to decide how it should vote on the conventional issues which 
dominate political debate. 
Not only do Nationalist parties operate and seek to gain support by 
making known their position on socio-economic issues, they are obliged to 
develop some kind of ideological image including a conventional left-right 
component in order to explain the kind of new state they wish to establish. 
Nationalist parties will find it very difficult to portray themselves in 
exclusively nationalist terms sterilised of class politics. An ideal of self-
government which excludes any notion of socio-economic affairs would be 
skeletal and lack appeal in modern liberal democracies where the notion of 
the state is so intimately connected with welfare, public sector intervention 
and social justice. The distinctiveness of sub-state nationalism in developed 
liberal democracies, as opposed to Third World nationalism, is partly found 
in the nature of the existing state. Otherwise, as the SNP discovered in the 
1960s and 1970s, Nationalist parties leave themselves open to attack from 
both the left and right. 
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The 1969 party conference involved a challenge to the leadership on 
the issue. The incumbent chairman was defeated by Billy Wolfe, who 
believed that the party needed to develop a moderate left ideological 
position. The dominant view during most of the post-war period, 
personified by the defeated chairman, had been that the SNP should be a 
movement for independence rather than a conventional political party with 
a programme of policies. However this was never fully developed during 
the 1970s partly because there was a feeling that it was somehow possible to 
develop a programme of policies without accepting a clear ideology. In fact, 
a left of centre ideology was developed though many senior party members 
would deny this. Part of the reason was that most of the SNP seats won in 
1974 were won from Tories and there was a fear that it was necessary to play 
down the party's left-wing position. This misunderstanding of the SNP's 
support - which was clearly not based on disaffected Tories but an anti-
Tory coalition- played a part in the party losing support in 1979. 
Left vs Right 
Of course, left and right are relative terms, and compared with other 
British parties represented in Parliament the SNP's centre of gravity is 
further to the left. In recent years debate over defence has been waged not 
over whether the party should be unilateralist. Unilateralism has never 
been seriously challenged in the SNP since it was adopted as policy in the 
early 1960s. The contentious issue has been membership of NATO. The 
SNP was anti-NATO for a period in the 1960s and returned to this position 
at its 1981 conference in the context of the revival of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament and the international political climate. It is highly 
significant that this was the only significant left-right division on an issue of 
policy which came before party conference in the 1980s and emerged 
outwith the context of factional politic. 
When socio-economic policy is considered, the SNP's consistent 
position as a party of the left is evident. At the 1979 party conference which 
is sometimes inaccurately interpreted as marking a lurch to the right saw the 
party enthusiastically accept a resolution accepting the primacy of the 
public sector in the regeneration of the Scottish economy and demanded 
that oil revenues be used to eliminate poverty and deprivation rather than 
fund tax cuts. This was at a time when both the Labour and Conservative 
Parties were vying with one another to be seen as providers of tax cuts. It is 
also notable that supporting the resolution were Stephen Maxwell and 
Margo MacDonald who were defeated in their bids to win the two leading 
offices in the SNP. 
A case could be made that the party vs. movement and left vs. right 
tensions are one and the same. The lack of anything approaching a right-
wing prospectus and the existence of agreement on most policy issues 
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suggests that many described in internal SNP debates and beyond as "right-
wing" are more accurately "cultural nationalists". Their aims are 
principally the maintenance of a sense of Scottish identity, not necessarily 
defined in terms of political institutions or citizenship. 
Fundamentalist vs. Gradualist 
The fundamentalist position rejects the legitimacy of the existing state 
and would perceive any measure of self -government short of independence 
with suspicion. From this perspective, devolution might be viewed not as a 
step on the road to independence but as a sop designed to dissipate energies 
and appease national sentiment. The refusal of central authorities to 
countenance any measure of devolution prior to the emergence and growth 
of support for Nationalist parties can be expected to evoke cynicism and 
might be seen as confirming the view that devolution involves not a 
measure of self-government but appeasement. 
The remarkable unity within the SNP during the late 1970s in support 
of the measure of devolution contrasts sharply with the reaction and 
disunity following the referendum in 1979. Though the SNP held a debate 
at its annual conference in 1976 at which opposition to devolution short of 
independence was expressed, the margin of support for accepting the 
"stepping stone" was considerable and the party fell behind this position 
with little public disagreement. 
It was only after the failure of Westminster to implement its scheme of 
devolution in 1979 following the referendum and the subsequent loss of 
nine of its eleven seats that the SNP reacted against devolution. At the 
party conference in 1979 a resolution was passed by a large majority stating 
that the SNP would "not engage in any more dealings in assemblies, 
devolution, or meaningful talks."(?) Ironically, the election of the 
Conservative government made this fundamentalist line redundant in that 
there was then no prospect during Mrs Thatcher's tenure of "assemblies, 
devolution or meaningful talks". The fundamentalism of Thatcher's 
unionism was the mirror image of the fundamentalism of the SNP's 
nationalism. This was the most important debate at the conference and the 
results in the elections of national office-bearers reflected this. The new 
chairman, Gordon Wilson, and the senior vice-chairman were both elected 
in the reaction against devolution. The reaction following electoral defeat 
led the party back to fundamentals, which meant "independence nothing 
less", as the hardliners put it. 
Over the course of the 1979-83 Parliament this was recognised to be an 
untenable position. Gordon Wilson slowly returned the party to a more 
gradualist position, having himself been elected chairman on a 
fundamentalist platform. The need for unity across the fundamentalist-
gradualist divide required a bridge which Wilson found in the form of a 
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constitutional convention. The idea involved the election by proportional 
representation of a Scottish convention which would determine Scotland's 
constitutional status. The constitutional options available to Scots would 
range from the Conservative's support for the status quo to the SNP's 
preferred option of independence within the European Community. The 
convention idea eventually won support at the party's 1984 conference. The 
previous year's conference had defeated- by 173 to 141- an amendment to 
a resolution supporting a Convention. The idea allowed the party to 
campaign for independence, thus appealing to the fundamentalist wing, 
while not rejecting anything short of that goal. It amounted to self-
determination rather than self-government and was a modus vivendi 
between these two tendencies in the party. 
The convention idea has a curious pedigree. The Conservatives had 
proposed a convention in the late 1970s as an alternative to the Labour 
government's devolution proposals. With the Conservatives divided on the 
issue but largely opposed to a Scottish Assembly, fearing that their support 
would decline if they opposed devolution and determined not to oppose it 
openly, the convention idea allowed a degree of unity around a 
commitment bridging tendencies in that party and simultaneously 
committing it to nothing in particular. The device was similarly used in the 
SNP but from a different vantage point. Similarly the Convention 
supported by the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly in recent years is 
motivated purely by the desire to bridge differences between the parties 
favouring some measure of Home Rule and it has little if any support in 
itself. 
These three underlying tensions in the SNP- party vs movement, left 
vs right, fundamentalist vs gradualist - do not make up the complete 
picture. The role of personalities is important. The divisions over issues 
such as European Community membership does not seem to fit any of the 
three tensions very comfortably. Fundamentalists might be expected to 
oppose it on the grounds that it involved the loss of a degree of sovereignty; 
the left might be expected to oppose it as did the Labour left as some 
capitalist conspiracy (though the British left's hang-up over the European 
Community, as the British right's, is wrapped up in notions of 
Parliamentary sovereignty and British nationalism which should not afflict 
the SNP left); while those who see the SNP as a movement might be 
expected to see the issue as irrelevant. In fact, the divisions on these issues 
have been difficult to classify. The ad hoc nature of the alliances on the 
question suggest that factional politics failed to divide the party on all 
important issues which arose during the period of great factional activity in 
the early 1980s. This may have been explained by the fact that the '79 
Group itself was divided with some leading members deeply opposed while 
others were strong advocates of European Community membership. 
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The Emergence of the '79 Group 
The months between the referendum and general election in Spring 
1979 and the party conference in the Autumn brought into the open existing 
differences: 
The '79 Group was set up during this period, offering a left-wing 
critique of the party's recent history. It had initially called itself the Interim 
Committee for Political Discussion but soon became known as the '79 
Group. The aptness of the name was probably never fully appreciated 
either by its members nor by its critics. It was not just the year the Group 
was set up but represented a constant reference point around which debate 
centred throughout its short history. The reaction, intolerance and 
catastrophic electoral and psychological defeats which marked 1979 were 
features which over-shadowed internal debate during the early 1980s. The 
'79 Group and the reaction to it were merely manifestations of the reaction 
to the events of Spring 1979. 
At its inaugural meeting in August, the '79 Group adopted three aims-
independence, socialism and republicanism. It would be a mistake to take 
these aims at face value or to assume that the failure of its candidates in 
elections to party office at conference was the result of right-wing 
sentiments amongst delegates. However much the '79 Group attempted to 
portray itself as the organised left and its opponents as right-wing, the most 
important reason for its lack of success and eventual forced disbandment in 
1982 was the combination of a fundamentalist backlash, fear that the 
constitutional issue was being demoted, the acrimonious terms of political 
debate in the context of recriminations following defeat, and concern that 
the party's fissiparious tendencies were getting out of control. The position 
of the non-aligned dominant tendency within the party was crucial in 
initially deploring the establishment of the Group but tolerating its 
existence, as conference voted in 1979. It was also critical in the decision in 
1982 to proscribe all organised factions in the party. 
The '79 Group clearly viewed the need for the party to develop a 
sharper left of centre position. It therefore belonged to the party rather 
than movement tendency. Though there were a few individuals who were 
hardline fundamentalists in the Group, it was generally associated with the 
gradualist tendency. At its inaugural meeting a paper was accepted critical 
of the fundamentalist position and its membership included some who had 
been closely identified with the gradualist position. 
Around this time another faction emerged, also out of disillusionment 
and in reaction to the defeats in 1979. Sion Nan Gaidheal (SNG) was a 
fundamentalist movement believing in militant direct action. If it had a 
conventional ideological position, it was right-wing. In many respects it was 
the antithesis ofthe '79 Group. SNG was not, however, a faction within the 
SNP though its members were largely drawn from the party. The divisions 
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in the SNP might be expected to have been deepest between these groups. 
In fact, a degree of mutual self-interest operated, resulting in cross-
factional support. An early attempt to proscribe each group separately 
failed in December 1980 when they combined in turn to support each other. 
With the support of non-aligned members these moves failed. The cross-
factional support was, not untypically in political parties, motivated by 
support for the right to organise in groups rather than agreed aims or 
outlook. 









The '79 Group's existence was deplored at conference in 1979 but an 
attempt to proscribe it failed. At the SNP conference in Aberdeen in 1981 
the '79 Group reached its apogee. Conference accepted a resolution 
supported by '79 Group members demanding that a campaign of effective 
civil disobedience should be organised in opposition to the rising levels of 
unemployment. This was hailed as a great victory for the '79 Group but the 
conference's support was really only a delayed reaction to the referendum. 
Two other key resolutions were targeted by the Group- one calling for 
an independent Scotland to withdraw from NATO and adopt a policy of 
armed neutrality, the other calling on the party to recognise the collapse of 
the Scottish controlled private sector of the economy and to plan for an 
enlarged, democratically controlled public sector. The SNP had always 
been unilateralist and had previously supported withdrawal from NATO. 
A number of senior party members outside the Group who had joined the 
party in the early 1960s, such as Billy Wolfe and Isobel Lindsay, had been 
long-standing CND supporters and the chairman of Scottish CND at the 
time had been an SNP parliamentary candidate. The change in policy owed 
little to the influence of the '79 Group and far more to the international 
political climate, the revival of CND and a long-standing unilateralist 
tradition in the party. Neither was the other resolution a great break with 
the party's previous policy. It had, after all, voted for a similar resolution at 
the 1979 conference, a conference which was seen as unfavourable to the 
'79 Group. None of these resolutions, nor the election of Group members 
to key offices, could be entirely credited to the '79 Group. This was not 
appreciated, least of all by its membership. Support for each of these 
reflected the dominant non-aligned tendency in the SNP. 
The '79 Group misinterpreted these votes and the election of Sillars as 
Policy Vice Chairman. The '79 Group assumed that it had made great 
progress but the resolutions it had targeted were acceptable to the 
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dominant tendency and support for them owed little to the activities of the 
Group. On the central issue of the fundamentalist/gradualist tension, the 
party had shown signs of moving from its more fundamentalist position but 
retained its suspicion of devolution. But by linking the civil disobedience 
campaign to the Scottish Assembly building the party alienated a numberof 
members (and provided an excuse for others) on the fundamentalist wing of 
the party. 
The party's mood had been misread by the '79 Group and the 
subsequent party conference saw a backlash. The role of the Campaign for 
Nationalism in this was important but probably less so than appeared at the 
time. A number of party members had wanted the '79 Group proscribed 
from its inception but they were never a significant enough number to bring 
this about. By organising themselves into an alternative faction, the 
Campaign for Nationalism forced the issue. Once more the critical element 
in the party was the non-aligned membership. Rose's comments regarding 
this element's greater concern with the gross differences between parties, 
their passive attitude towards policy issues and determined effort to avoid 
identification with particular factions is significant. It would be mistaken to 
see the non-aligned element as entirely passive, at least in the case of the 
SNP, but the primacy placed on ensuring unity within the party is certainly 
evident. Additionally, in the eyes of many SNP members, the Group- with 
its preponderance of young and abrasive members- conformed with Beller 
and Belloni's comments that factions tend to be seen as illegal, malevolent 
and pathological. The party had been tolerant but the debacle of the civil 
disobedience campaign, severely damaged the Group's position. The 
support for proscription of all groups reflected a fear amongst the non-
aligned that things were getting out of hand. However, the return of Jim 
Sillars as Vice Chairman suggested that the party did not intend a 
witchhunt. 
By May 1983, the SNP had still to find prospective candidates in 32 
constituencies (out of 72). When the election came, the party was in an even 
less prepared state than was Michael Foot's Labour Party. Its vote fell by 
almost a third from 17.3% in 1979 to 11.8%, with 53 deposits lost. It would 
be entirely wrong to blame the '79 Group, Jim Sillars, civil disobedience, 
the Campaign for Nationalism or Gordon Wilson for the result. The failings 
can be explained by the psychological blow - the greatest achievement of 
the anti-devolutionsits such as Brian Wilson, Neil Kinnock, Teddy Taylor 
and Margaret Thatcher- which was inflicted on theN ational Movement in 
Scotland. The internal feuding witnessed in the SNP between 1979 and 1983 
were functions of the high expectations of success in the late 1979s and 
defeats in 1979. 
Instead of building up its credibility and establishing a clear profile on 
central economic and social issues, the SNP had spent four years reacting to 
and recovering from the Spring of 1979. In retrospect, many party members 
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view the period as difficult but ultimately involved a process of 
strengthening the party. Billy Wolfe's forging of steel metaphor in his 
Scotland Lives comes to mind. The years 1979 to 1983 were remarkable in 
the history of the party in exacerbating differences. Though these still exist, 
a degree of unity developed following the salutary effect of the electoral 
setback in 1983. Defeat had acted as a schismatic force following a period of 
great optimism in 1979 but acted as a cohesive force after 1983. 
The Emerging Consensus: 1983-1987 
As in the Labour Party, the election in 1983 served to strengthen the 
leadership and inject a new realism into the Scottish National Party. A 
consensus had already emerged, almost unnoticed, during 1979-83. As 
early as 1981 Gordon Wilson had used the term "moderate left of centre" to 
describe the SNP. This came into common usage during this period and 
served as a base for the consensus which developed. In August, Gordon 
Wilson announced that he wanted the party to change its policy in three 
areas. First, he wanted to reverse the anti-NATO policy; second, he sought 
to commit the party explicitly in favour of European Community 
membership; and third, he sought to move away from the fundamentalist, 
anti-devolution position. 
As mentioned earlier, the party had a tradition of unilateralism and 
opposition to NATO and on this the chairman failed to move the party. 
Notably, his principal opponent was Isobel Lindsay who had been a strident 
critic of the '79 Group and a number of '79 Group members were believed 
to be equivocal on the matter. The issue of Europe might have been 
expected to have divided the party along its fundamentalist/gradualist line, 
with fundamentalists arguing that membership of the Community was a 
negation of full Scottish sovereignty. The fact that the party's only Euro-
MP, Winnie Ewing, was a vehement supporter of Community membership 
was certainly influential in delivering a substantial body of the 
fundamentalist wing in support. Similarly, the strong support for Europe of 
Jim Sillars and Alex Salmond ensured that a wide body of members rallied 
behind Gordon Wilson. Once more, Isobel Lindsay opposed the policy. 
For Sillars, European Community membership offers the SNP a 
means of countering the "jibe of separatism" and provides a clear and 
credible constitutional option. (S) Though he had campaigned against 
continued membership in 1975, he accepted the result and his short-lived 
Scottish Labour Party had supported independence within the European 
Community. Winnie Ewing's conversion appears to have resulted from her 
experience in the European Parliament. The pro-Europe policy of the SNP 
followed the turn around in the position of Plaid Cymru which dramatically 
reversed its former opposition to membership during the 1983 election 
campaign. 
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Wilson's third change was his most important in terms of attempting to 
find a modus vivendi between the fundamentalists and gradualists. 
However, this was to prove the most contentious of his proposals. Once 
more, his success was due to the support of leading members across the 
party. Wilson presented the idea of a constitutional convention to the 
party. This was to involve the election by proportional representation of a 
convention which would have full powers to determine the constitutional 
status of Scotland. All political parties would be able to contest elections on 
their respective constitutional platforms. As well as uniting the party's 
wings it was designed to attract the support of other parties in Scotland. 
Obvious practical difficulties ensue from this. Any scheme accepted by 
the Convention short of independence would clearly have to be acceptable 
to the rest of the United Kingdom as it was bound to have implications 
beyond Scotland. The notion that Scotland could make a unilateral 
declaration of devolution, as was implicit in the Convention proposal, is 
absurd. However, the Convention idea allowed Wilson to unite the party. 
On the one hand, the SNP could campaign for independence which kept 
many on the fundamentalist wing of the party happy while on the other 
hand this did not mean rejection of anything short of independence if the 
Scots rejected independence. From the point of view of facilitating unity 
within the SNP, the policy succeeded to a large extent though some 
members remained sceptical. 
The agreement on the latter two matters, together with the return to 
membership and the party's executive of prominent '79 Group members 
aided the party in its campaigns. At the Euro-elections in 1984 Winnie 
Ewing was returned with a much increased majority contrary to the 
predictions of pundits, and the Nationalists won 18% of the vote. In local 
elections the SNP began to reverse the downward trend. At the District 
elections in 1984 the party had mixed fortunes but won control of Angus. 
There, the new SNP Provost was the former MP, Andrew Welsh, who was 
to regain the parliamentary seat from the Solicitor General in 1987. In 1986, 
the Nationalists performed well in Tayside - mainly in Angus - and in 
North-East Scotland. These were to be the areas which returned the three 
SNP MPs at the 1987 election. 
Essentially, the 1983-87 period involved the party recognising that its 
internal battles during the previous Parliament had been electorally 
damaging. The consensus which was emerging by the 1987 election 
revolved around the party accepting a left-wing pro-European Community 
position. The fundamentalist/gradualist tension was eased by support for 
the Convention and the recognition that unity was essential. But it was not 
until after the 1987 Election that the greatest opportunities for advance 
were presented to the SNP. 
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Independence in Europe and the PoD Tax 
Two developments wholly outwith the control of the SNP offered the 
party opportunities in the period after 1987. The imposition of the poll tax 
and heightened awareness of the European Community allowed the SNP to 
grab the initiative and set the agenda of Scottish politics for the first time 
since the mid-1970s. The poll tax was important as a symbol of a 
Government policy foisted on Scotland and Labour's palpable failure to 
prevent this. The Independence in Europe theme providing the SNP with 
the clearest articulation of the constitutional goal it was seeking at any stage 
in the party's history. In the context of debate on "1992" the Nationalists 
were offering a substantive, realistic and positive message alongside their 
poll tax campaign. 
The most remarkable aspect of both the Scotland in Europe and non-
payment positions was the degree of unity which was achieved. The party 
conference in Inverness in 1988 saw resolutions explicitly supporting these 
matters passed overwhelmingly. The Govan by-election in November 1988 
provided the SNP with the necessary platform on which to argue this two-
pronged position. No more effective articulator of the SNP case could have 
been found than Jim Sillars. The Govan Campaign demonstrated the 
degree of unity in the SNP. The support of figures who were members of the 
'79 Group as well as Winnie Ewing, Gordon Wilson and Margaret Ewing 
was significant. The party membership failed to divide into factions on 
either issue. Any disagreement on either the poll tax or Independence in 
Europe did not correspond with the fault-lines - and notably the 
fundamentalist/gradualist tension -identified earlier. 
The one issue which had the potential to damage the party was the 
Convention. The modus vivendi achieved between gradualists and 
fundamentalists was severely strained when the Campaign for a Scottish 
Assembly adopted the SNP policy and following Govan set about 
establishing a cross party Convention. The CSA had earlier invited a 
committee under Sir Robert Grieve to suggest means of establishing a 
Convention. The Claim of Right for Scotland used the language of popular 
sovereignty which was central to the SNP's proposals but in practice the 
proposals had no popular democratic component. In essence the CSA's 
practical proposals - as opposed to the SNP's policy - allowed for the 
dominance of a minority party within the Convention. It would be 
extremely naive to imagine that the Labour Party would have failed to use 
the forum in the lead up to the European Elections to mount a sustained 
attack on the SNP. That the SNP should have realised this well in advance 
of their decision not to participate is the only criticism that can be made of 
the party. 
The SNP decision not to participate was supported across the party at 
National Council in March 1989. The meeting in Port Glasgow was one of 
the largest the party had seen in years. Gordon Wilson's Government of 
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Scotland Bill proposing a directly elected Convention presented in 
Parliament in March 1980 had been the first attempt to win support for the 
idea (only four Labour MPs had supported it, one voted against it and the 
remaining 39, including Donald Dewar, abstained). Jim Sillars had moved 
the resolution supporting an elected Convention at SNP conference in 
September 1984. That Wilson and Sillars, along with Margaret Ewing, were 
the SNP negotiators at the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly meetings and 
recommended that the party should not participate was undoubtedly 
important. 
The mood of the SNP had changed dramatically from the early 1980s 
when the shadow of 1979 coloured all decisions and had led to charges and 
recriminations. The potential for a split on fundamentalist/gradualist lines 
in 1989 was lessened by the fact that many of those who were closely 
associated with the gradualist position were calling for non-participation. 
That some of those who called for the SNP to participate in the Convention 
were opponents of Independence in Europe weakened their position. 
Indeed, the manner in which leading supporters of participation articulated 
their position suggested that they viewed the SNP less as a political party 
and more as a movement attempting to exert pressure on other parties. 
Isobel Lindsay's speech to National Council was in this mould. But the 
dominant view within the SNP by the late 1980s was that it was a political 
party with a clear position on the left-right axis and a far clearer idea of the 
constitutional settlement it sought. 
Conclusion 
Oliver Brown's sense of irony was better developed than that of many 
SNP members who appear to have taken all too literally his words quoted at 
the beginning. Like all political parties, the SNP has its different tendencies 
which have erupted into organised factions. Journalistic short-hand tended 
to misrepresent the essential nature of debate within the SNP. The party 
has long gravitated towards the left-getting it to recognise/admit/proclaim/ 
build on this were aims of '79 Group members. Overlying and confusing 
this debate was the central tension at the heart of the SNP between 
gradualism and fundamentalism. On this the SNP has been less consistent 
and tends to react more to circumstances. At moments, the dominant 
tendency within the party has favoured one then the other position. 
The case of the SNP confirms that the emergence of factions can 
principally result from a severe electoral setback after a period of great 
optimism. The need to explain the setback, seek some way of rever:sing it 
and simply come to terms with the disillusionment of defeat provide an 
inauspicious background for party unity. The underlying tensions which 
exist in any party will be exacerbated in such circumstances. The '79 Group 
were a manifestation and not cause of the SNP's difficulties in the early 
1980s. On the other hand defeat can act as a catalyst leading to unity as the 
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1983 result demonstrated. 
Journalistic approaches to the SNP which attempted to pigeon-hole 
every difference in left-right terms - something which many '79 Group 
members were guilty of - confused attempts to understand the Scottish 
National Party. Organised factions in political parties which have little 
history of them are bound to be suspect. The great danger is in assuming 
that a party has divided clearly along the lines of Group formation or that 
when a policy or approach is adopted which is part of the programme of a 
Group that this is largely due to its activities. Political parties are too 
complex and the role of the non-aligned party membership too great to 
assume either of these things. 
If the essentials of the '79 Group's aims is considered- or at least those 
of its most prominent members - it is clear that they commanded latent 
support in the SNP. The typology developed earlier showing the Group to 
support a left-wing, gradualist party (as opposed to a right/apolitical, 
fundamentalist movement) were achieved. Arguably, these essentials were 
frustrated by the very existence of the '79 Group. The connotation of 
illegality and malevolence associated with organised factions meant that 
what the Group advocated was tainted. 
Dr James Mitchell, University ofStrathclyde, Department of Government. 
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